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Abstract 
Some scholars have understood that Spinoza’s extreme rationalism, 
nominalism, conventionalism, and rejection of a semantic theory of 
truth make his philosophy incapable to use language for philosophical 
and scientific purposes; insofar he considered language a source of 
inadequate knowledge, falsity, and error. Thus Spinoza finds 
contradiction in his inevitable use of language to express his 
philosophy. This paper has four aims: first, propose an explanation on 
why language is inadequate knowledge for Spinoza; second, present 
differences between inadequacy, falsity, and error in language; third, 
argue on the Spinozian use of the geometrical method as a solution for 
the adequate use of language in philosophical and scientific work; 
finally, show the problems and limits of this solution for metaphysical 
discussions. 
Keywords: 17th Century Theory of Language, Nominalism, 
Conventionalism, Memory, Denotation, Connotation. 
 
 
Introduction 
 It is common to think that Spinoza’s extreme rationalism, conventionalism and 
nominalism reject language of philosophical knowledge. While contemporary philosophers 
such as Leibniz consider language as one of the primary philosophical issues to study, for 
Spinoza it is only part of the first kind of knowledge. According to him words are source of 
error and falsity, because¾among other things¾it gives us an inadequate knowledge of 
things product of contingent associations between bodily motions and images. Spinoza 
thinks that we only know things truly and adequately through intellectual inferences, i.e., 
through demonstrations made by reason and intuitive science¾, which he considers the 
second and the third kinds of knowledge, respectively. Some scholars have understood that 
this rationalist tenet1 concludes that language is always deceitful, thus Spinoza should have 
encouraged the idea that adequate knowledge cannot relate with it. 
This latter conclusion gives rise to a number of problems for Spinoza’s philosophy: 
mainly, it seems that there is an unbridgeable gap between language and intellect (reason 
and intuitive science), i.e., between arbitrary associations of images and ideas, on the one 
part, and eternal, immutable, adequate, true ideas, on the other. If this is the case, then 
language has no room in Spinoza’s philosophy, and his efforts to use it even under a 
geometrical method are only proofs of his inconsistency of thought.  
	
1 Other tenets of Spinoza’s rationalism are: the identification of logical necessity and causal necessity, thus 
there is an answer to every “why” question. For Bennet (“Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” p. 61), this identification is 
an error that arises from confusion. 
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 This paper has four aims: first, propose an explanation on why language is 
inadequate knowledge for Spinoza; second, present differences between inadequacy, 
falsity, and error in language; third, argue on the Spinozian use of the geometrical method 
as a solution for the adequate use of language in philosophical and scientific work; finally, 
show the problems and limits of this solution for metaphysical discussions.  
 
 
 
1. Denotation in Language 
 
For Spinoza, language is an association of images and ideas. According to him, words are 
constituted by corporeal motions, and therefore involve the concept of extension. The 
process of association is described by the following proposition: 
 
“If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at 
the same time, then when the mind subsequently imagines one of 
them, it will immediately recollect the others also.” [2p18] 
 
And the demonstration reads: 
 
“The mind (by 2p17c) imagines a body because the human body is 
affected and disposed as it was affected when certain of its parts were 
struck by the external body itself. But (by hypothesis) the body was 
then so disposed that the mind imagined two [or more] bodies at once; 
therefore it will now also imagine two [or more] at once, and when the 
mind imagines one, it will immediately recollect the other also, q.e.d.” 
[2p18d] 
 
In order of understanding this, we must summarize certain principles of his metaphysics 
and physics. Spinoza affirms that God is the unique substance, which expresses its essence 
in infinite attributes, from which thought and extension are two of them. Because God 
expresses the same essence in infinite modes through infinite attributes, there is no 
interaction between attributes and their modifications; each attribute has the same order and 
connection in their respective modifications (1p28, 2p7). This parallelism of the attributes 
sustain that God has an idea of any modification through the attribute of thought. The 
human mind is the idea that God’s Intellect has of a human body actually existing (2p13).2  
Thus in order to understand and distinguish external things through language, we 
should know what happens in the human body.3 It is sufficient to recall Spinoza’s definition 
of image:  
 
	
2 All ideas are contained by God’s intellect, i.e., by the immediate infinite mode of the attribute of thought 
(1p21, Ep 64), by which God thinks all the things that he produces (1p16). For the aim of this paper, I make 
no distinction between the following terms: infinite intellect (intellectum infinitum: 1p16, 1p17s, 2p7s, etc.), 
God’s infinite intellect (infinitus intellectus Dei: 2p11c, 2p43s), and God’s eternal and infinite intellect (Dei 
aeternum et infinitum intellectum: 5p40s). 
3 For a more profound study of Spinoza’s physics and the process of sensory perception, cf. my “Spinoza on 
Sensory Perception”. 
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“[T]o retain the customary words [verba], the affections of the human 
body whose ideas represent4 external bodies as present to us, we shall call 
images of things, even if they do not reproduce the [NS: external] figures 
of things. And when the mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say 
that it imagines.” [2p17s]5 
 
The human brain retains impressions of the external bodies affections when they are 
frequent (2post5).6 This process begins with an external object affecting frequently an 
external sense of the human body (e.g. sight, smell, touch, etc.). The resulting brain 
impression is a mode (affection) of the human body that involves the nature of both bodies 
(the human body and the external body), but not in the same manner. An image is an idea 
of an affection of the human body; that is, an idea of certain mode preserved in the human 
body. When the human mind affirms that image, it also affirms a particular constitution of 
the human body, i.e. the actual existence of the nature of the human body, as well as the 
particular existence of the external body (2p16, 2p16c). At the same time, by parallelism, 
Spinoza relates a constitution of the human body with an idea that the human mind has of 
it; which means that the human mind has an idea of whatever happens in the human body 
(2p7, 2p12). Thus an image is also a “vague experience” that the human mind has of 
external objects (2p40s2); i.e., a particular point of view that a person has of certain object.  
Spinoza identifies “image” and “representation” because they both require a 
medium—in this case, the brain impression that involves a determinate causal affection 
from an external body—that brings to the mind something that does not have to be present 
at the moment of the contemplation. Spinoza calls “images of things” (rerum Imago) any 
idea of a brain impression that implies the nature of an external body and represents it as if 
it were present, even though it is not really present or it no longer exists. For Spinoza’s 
epistemology, the contemplation of an image and the affirmation of the existence of the 
object of the image is one and the same thing. This is because he considers that, for one 
part, an idea is always idea of something; for the other part, there is no distinction between 
an idea and the affirmation of the content of the idea. Spinoza includes as images 
“affections that do not reproduce the figures of things” in order to incorporate not only 
pictures, but any affection that represents an external body, such as sounds (cf. Ep 17, pp. 
76-78). 
Now, let us go back to the process of association of ideas described in 2p18 
&2p18d. Spinoza calls “memory” (Latin: “memoria”) this process (2p18s). Even though 
the demonstration does not mention it, this process of association of images happens in the 
	
4 The Latin word is “repræsentant,” which we need to translate as “represents.” Cf. next note. 
5 The Latin text states: “Porrò, ut verba usitata retineamus, Corporis humani affectiones, quarum ideæ 
Corpora externa, velut nobis præsentia repræsentant, rerum imagines vocabimus, tametsi rerum figuras non 
referunt. Et cùm Mens hâc ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem imaginari dicemus.” 
6 This process is expressed by 2post5 in the following terms: “When a fluid part of the human body is 
determined by an external body so that it frequently thrusts against a soft part [of the body], it changes its 
surface and, as it were, impresses on [the soft part] certain traces of the external body striking against [the 
fluid part].” Spinoza’s physics only considers mechanical impacts, and repulsive forces, but not attraction or 
pulls (Bennet, “Spinoza’s Metaphysics,” p. 62). This general explanation contrasts with the detailed Cartesian 
explanation of the affection on the pineal gland from external senses. Cf. Descartes: Treatise on Man, AT XI 
174 ff.; CSM I 105; Passions of the Soul (I, 7, AT XI, 332; Descartes, 1985: 330. Cf. Description of the 
Human Body, I, Preface, p. 316; AT XI, 227; Descartes, 1985: 316. Cf. Gueroult, Spinoza. L’Âme, p. 202, n. 
24; Cf. pp. 171 ff. 
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attribute of thought meanwhile¾by the parallelism of the attributes¾occurs an association 
of brain impressions in the attribute of extension. When the mind affirms one of these 
impressions, it immediately will affirm the other impression. Thus the human mind will 
imagine both things at the same time. Spinoza puts an example: 
 
 “And from this [process of association of images] we clearly 
understand why the mind, from the thought of one thing, immediately 
passes to the thought of another, which has no likeness to the first: as, 
for example, from the thought of the word pomum a Roman will 
immediately pass to the thought of the fruit [viz. an apple], which has 
no similarity to that articulate sound and nothing in common with it 
except that the body of the same man has often been affected by these 
two [NS: at the same time], that is, that the man often heard the word 
pomum while he saw the fruit.” [2p18s] 
 
This process of association of ideas explains the denotation or signification of nouns. The 
articulate sound “pomum” is an affection of the human body, as well as the sensory 
perception of an apple. The human body is capable of being affected at the same time by 
both affections, and when this process happens regularly, it retains both affections as if it 
were one; thus the human mind will remember both images at the same time when it 
imagines one of them. This is the origin of denotation, signification, or reference of nouns, 
in which certain images of sensory perception are joined in a first train of thought. The 
articulated sounds “pomum”, “apple”, “manzana” are not part of the nature of the red fruit 
that they denote, but are related to it through certain natural language education. None of 
these articulated sounds express the nature of the apple, but only indicate those features by 
which the human body has been affected by the apple, such as certain colors, shape, smell, 
taste, etc. Insofar the human mind is accustomed to call different objects by the same word, 
it will be able to form a general idea of it. For instance, English-speaking people that are 
accustomed to eat fresh apples, will think that the denotation of the word “apple” is a fresh 
apple. On the contrary, English-speaking people that are accustomed to eat baked apples, 
will think that the denotation of the word “apple” is a baked apple. 
Spinoza has a conventionalist conception of language: language is grounded in 
explicit or implicit agreements, such as habit, instead of relation with external reality. 
Different associations of the certain things with different articulated sounds will be the 
origin of different natural languages. Furthermore, Spinoza will make no distinction 
between a natural language and a formal language. Through words we signify things 
(2p49s: “verba, quibus res significamus”). 
For Spinoza, a word is a synthesis (or association) between certain sounds and 
certain images of things. These images are also synthesis of other images. Thus a word is a 
sign that refers to certain images. Nevertheless scholars have pass out an important implicit 
supposition in Spinoza´s thoughts on language: that a word and a proposition (or synthesis 
of words) are synthesis of ideas that only differ in that the former does not make explicit 
the images that it associates, whilst the latter does. As we will see in the last section this 
does not mean that any proposition expresses an adequate idea; to do so is needed the 
participation of reason and intuition.  
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2. Language Inadequacy 1: Contingent Association 
 
For Spinoza there is no metaphysical contingency (1p29) because everything that exists is a 
modification of God (1p15), which means that it has been determined by God to exist and 
act in a certain way (1p24-1p26). The human mind has a true and necessary idea of things 
insofar it has an adequate idea of them, i.e., an idea that considered without the relation of 
correspondence with its object, has all the intrinsic properties of a true idea (2a4). A true 
idea is that which corresponds to its object (1a6: ideatum). Because the knowledge of an 
object implies the knowledge of its causes (1a4), a true idea of an object implies the 
knowledge of its causes.	On the contrary, an idea that a human mind has is inadequate if 
God’s Intellect cannot understand that idea only through the human mind but through the 
human mind affected by other ideas (2p35); and this is what happens with images of 
sensory perception. 
It is important to note that the Ethics’ arguments mainly depend on a scheme of 
completeness or incompleteness, sufficiency or insufficiency, of ideas conceived by a 
human mind insofar it is considered without the relation of correspondence with its object. 
This argument is founded both in the parallelism of the attributes, and God’s Intellect: an 
idea that a human mind has is adequate if God’s Intellect understands that idea only 
through that human mind; and that idea will have all the intrinsic properties of its 
extensional object. Spinoza argues that the human mind is more capable of understanding 
clearly and distinctly when the actions of its object (i.e., a human body, 2p13) depend more 
on itself alone, than when they depend on other bodies that concur with it in its acting 
(2p13s). For Spinoza, an association of images is an effect without causes, and by the only 
use of its imagination, a human mind cannot know the intrinsic properties of things. It will 
only know external features of things as it experiences them. For the purposes of this paper, 
we will only consider three kinds of imaginations: sensory perception, memory, and 
abstractions. 2p18s says that 2p18 & 2p18d had explained what memory is, because: 
 
“For it is nothing other than a certain connection of ideas involving 
the nature of things which are outside the human body¾a connection 
which is in the mind according to the order and connection of the 
affections of the human body.” [2p18s] 
 
Memory is the mental correspondence of a physical association of brain impressions. It is a 
certain association of images of bodies that affect in a certain order to the human body. 
This order is a diachronic (order in time) or a synchronic association of images (order in 
space). Thus it is an association of images that depends on the order and connection by 
which bodies have affected the human body; but this order does not express the nature (or 
essence) of those bodies. Consequently Spinoza explains, 
 
“I say, first, that the connection is only of those ideas which involve 
the nature of things outside the human body, but not of the ideas 
which explain the nature of the same things. For they are really (by 
2p16) ideas of affections of the human body which involve both its 
nature and that of external bodies.” [2p18s] 
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Memory does not express the nature of things (intrinsic features of the bodies represented), 
but only involves it; i.e., memory expresses only a fragmentary part of the causal process of 
association of external body affections. Even though there is no metaphysical contingency 
according to Spinoza (1p29), each person has a different memory (or order of associating 
images) insofar they are affected by things in different order. For instance, whilst a person 
includes in its meal a fresh apple, another person eats a baked apple; each one of them will 
think their meals with different images of apple. Insofar the order of memory does not 
express the nature of things, and that it is an association realized from the vague 
experiences of a person, memory could be called contingent.7  
Memory and images are not adequate ideas of the things they represent. Spinoza 
continues on 2p18s: 
 
“I say, second, that this connection [i.e., memory] happens according 
to the order and connection of the affections of the human body in 
order to distinguish it from the connection of ideas which happens 
according to the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives 
things through their first causes, and which is the same in all men.” 
[2p18s] 
 
Memory does not represent the first causes of things, but only the way images are 
associated through the way they affect at the same time to a person; especially if it is a 
frequent affection. On the contrary, the order of the intellect (God’s or human’s) is the 
order and connection of nature (metaphysical order). 
An image is not an idea of the essence of an external object. An image is an 
inadequate idea insofar they do not indicate the nature (or intrinsic properties) of the human 
body nor of the external body. That is to say that the human mind does not have an 
adequate knowledge of its body, of itself, and of external bodies that affect it and 
regenerate it through images (which is the proof aim by 2p19).  
For instance, when a person looks an apple for certain amount of time, he will be 
able to retain the image of that apple, and represent the apple with the features with which 
he saw it. For example, if he saw a fresh apple, he will recall the apple with the features of 
certain colors, textures, smell, etc., not those of a baked apple or a painted apple. That 
image does not involve the essence of the apple, but only the way in which that apple 
affected the human sight. 
 
 
 
3. Language Inadequacy 2: General Terms. 
 
Words cannot be adequate knowledge insofar they represent images, because these do not 
express adequate knowledge. Words inadequacy is clearer when we consider the process of 
abstraction, which is known as Spinoza’s nominalism. The process of abstraction has it 
	
7 Any contingency, corruption, falsity, and error should be explained by epistemology, not metaphysics. This 
seems to be the aim of the second book of Ethics as we read in 2p13s, where Spinoza grounds epistemology 
on physics. 
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origin in the affections and the human mind capacity to represent distinctly each one of the 
objects that affect the human body. Spinoza says that, 
 
“[…] the human body, being limited, is capable of forming distinctly 
only a certain number of images at the same time (1 have explained 
what an image is in 2p17s). If that number is exceeded, the images 
will begin to be confused, and if the number of rum images the body 
is capable of forming distinctly in itself at once is greatly exceeded, 
they will all be completely confused with one another. Since this is so, 
it is evident from 2p17c and 2p17s, that the human mind will be able 
to imagine distinctly, at the same time, as many bodies as there can be 
images formed at the same time in its body.” [2p40s1] 
 
Abstraction is a mental process that corresponds to a physical process where the human 
body is overwhelmed by affections produced by external bodies, in a certain time. 
Spinoza continues, 
 
“Those notions they call Universal, like Man, Horse, Dog, and the 
like, have arisen from similar causes, namely, because so many 
images (e.g., of men) are formed at one time in the human body that 
they surpass the power of imagining¾not entirely, of course, but still 
to the point where the mind can imagine neither slight differences of 
the singular [men] (such as the color and size of each one, etc.) nor 
their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only what they all 
agree in, insofar as they affect the body. For the body has been 
affected most [NS: forcefully] by [what is common], since each 
singular has affected it [by this property]. And [NS: the mind] 
expresses this by the word man, and predicates it of infinitely many 
singulars. For as we have said, it cannot imagine a determinate 
number of singulars.” [2p40s1] 
 
Spinoza considers that certain kind of universal terms are formed by the imagination 
according to the order in which they affected the human body. When the human mind 
represents the bodies that affected its body, it will loose a lot of the features that 
differentiate those bodies and will consider them under universal terms. These terms does 
not represent properties of those bodies, but certain features that the human mind retained 
of them as long as they affected more constantly its body. He continues: 
 
“But it should be noted that these notions are not formed by all [NS: 
men] in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance 
with what the body has more often been affected by, and what the 
mind imagines or recollects more easily. For example, those who have 
more often regarded men’s stature with wonder will understand by the 
word man an animal of erect stature. But those who have been 
accustomed to consider something else, will form another common 
image of men¾for example, that man is an animal capable of 
laughter, or a featherless biped, or a rational animal.” [2p40s1] 
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Universal terms formed by the imagination receive different connotations according 
to the particular experiences of each person. Meanwhile some people consider the erect 
stature for defining “man”, others consider laughter or reason.  
 
 
 
4. Language Inadequacy 3: Universal Terms. 
 
Spinoza says: 
 
“But when the images in the body are completely confused, the mind 
also will imagine all the bodies confusedly, without any distinction, 
and comprehend them as if under one attribute, namely, under the 
attribute of Being, Thing, and so forth. This can also be deduced from 
the fact that images are not always equally vigorous and from other 
causes like these, which it is not necessary to explain here. For our 
purpose it is sufficient to consider only one. For they all reduce to this: 
these terms signify ideas that are confused in the highest degree.” 
[2p40s1] 
 
Insofar men use universal terms constructed by their imagination to try explaining 
philosophical truths, they are having innumerable controversies. This will continue if we 
use transcendental terms such as “being”, “thing”, and “something” (2p40s1), because they 
are the total abstraction of any difference between things, apply to any of them, and will not 
let us conceive anything clearly and distinctly. 
 
“And similarly concerning the others¾each will form universal 
images of things according to the disposition of his body.” [2p40s1] 
 
The particular experience of each person guides the way they make abstractions and bring 
up general and universal terms.  
For Spinoza, language falsity consists in the absence of correspondence between the 
word and the body that it represents; i.e., it is a mental contemplation of an external object 
through the idea of a brain impression without awareness of its lack of correspondence to 
an inexistent body.  
The human intellect is part of God’s Intellect, thus the former has the right to know 
in the same way in which knows the latter. Human intellect comprehends reason and 
intuition (these are second and third kinds of knowledge, respectively). Meanwhile the 
intellect (human or divine) have an adequate idea of something, the human imagination has 
only an inadequate (i.e., incomplete, mutilated, and confused) idea of that thing. Spinoza 
calls this kind of knowledge “opinion” or “imagination” (2p40s2).8  2p35 says:  
	
8 It is important to note that Spinoza introduces this text to state that this is the first way in which the mind 
perceives things and forms universal notions. The second way is knowledge by signs. Although this paper 
does not consider the formation of universal notions, these notions work with the information provided by 
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“Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or 
mutilated and confused, ideas involve.”  
 
But this privation is not absolute, because there is no absolute ignorance according to 
Spinoza (2p35d). This privation is relative 
Thus, imagination or: 
 
“[...] knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, whereas 
knowledge of the second [i.e., reason] and of the third kind [i.e., 
intuition] is necessarily true” [2p41].  
 
This has leaded some scholars to think than Spinoza should have concluded that there is no 
relationship between reason and intuition with language; this statement excludes the 
scientific use of sensory experience. 
From this, Spinoza says that: 
 
 “[…] it is clear that we perceive many things and form universal 
notions: […] from signs, for example, from the fact that, having heard 
or read certain words, we recollect things, and form certain ideas of 
them, like those through which we imagine the things (P18S); […]” 
[2p40s2]  
 
 
 
5. Error in Language 
 
Spinoza says that words,  
 
“[…] are established according to the pleasure and power of 
understanding of ordinary people, so that they are only signs of things 
as they are in the imagination, but not as they are in the intellect. This 
is clear from the fact that names given to things that are only in the 
intellect, and not in the imagination, are often negative (for example, 
infinite, incorporeal, etc.), and also from the fact that they express 
negatively many things that are really affirmative, and conversely (for 
example, uncreated, independent, infinite, immortal). Because the 
contraries of these are much more easily imagined, they occurred first 
to the earliest men, and they used positive names. We affirm and deny 
many things because the nature of words¾not the nature of 
things¾allows us to affirm them. And in our ignorance of this, we 
easily take something false to be true.” [TdIE 89] 
 
	
sense perception. Furthermore, Spinoza calls opinion or imagination the random experience along with the 
knowledge by signs (2p40s2). 
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Spinoza makes a genealogy of words: because we are born ignorant of the causes and 
nature of things (order and connection of the intellect), the earliest men only used their 
imagination to think themselves and the world¾and thought only through images and 
inadequate ideas¾, and associated their spontaneous and inadequate thoughts with positive 
terms. As men developed reason and were capable of considering the internal order and 
connection of things, they realize positive ideas that rejected the inadequate ideas signified 
by words already forged; thus they used negative terms to refer to positive and adequate 
ideas. For instance, negative terms such as “infinite” is in reality a positive idea; meanwhile 
“finitude” is a positive term that refers to a negative idea; i.e., the negation of the infinite. If 
we give more importance to the word “infinite” than to the adequate conception that it 
expresses (insofar is the condition of the finite), we will think that is impossible for an 
infinite thing to exist.  
The main problem from this different construction of denotation of general and 
universal terms is the following:  
 
 “[I]t is not surprising that so many controversies have arisen among 
the philosophers, who have wished to explain natural things by mere 
images of things.” [2p40s1] 
 
Innumerable controversies and conflicts follow from philosophers using general and 
universal terms to try to explain the nature of things. As we have said, does terms does not 
express the nature of things, but the particular biography of each person as they are affected 
by their particular imaginations.  
In this sense, Spinoza says at the end of the second book of the Ethics: 
 
“I begin, therefore, by warning my readers, first, to distinguish 
accurately between an idea, or concept, of the mind, and the images of 
things which we imagine. And then it is necessary to distinguish 
between ideas and the words by which we signify things.” [2p49s9] 
 
For the Dutch philosopher, if we do not distinguish accurately ideas, images, and words 
(verba), we will confound illusory things with real ones. In this passage we must read 
“idea” as “adequate idea”; “image” as “inadequate idea”.  
This passage shows Spinoza’s rejection of a semantic conception of truth; i.e., truth 
is not a property of words or sentences, thus we must distinguish common meaning of 
words and nature of things. Some scholars have seen this distinction as the origin of 
contradiction in Spinoza’s usage of language: v. g. according to Savan, this passage seems 
to understand language not as a medium, but as an obstacle for adequate knowledge. How 
can Spinoza make any philosophical use of words such as “being”, “order”, “man”, “good”, 
insofar he accepts that they are the result of the abstraction of particulars, and they are not 
naturally related? Spinoza says:  
 
“[T]hose who confuse words with the idea, or with the very 
affirmation which the idea involves, think that they can will 
something contrary to what they are aware of, when they only affirm 
	
9 The latin text says: “[…] distinguant inter ideas et verba, quibus res significamus.” 
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or deny with words something contrary to what they are aware of. But 
these prejudices can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the 
nature of thought, which does not at all involve the concept of 
extension. He will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a 
mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in 
words. For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by 
corporeal motions, which do not at all involve the concept of 
thought”. [2p49s] 
 
Spinoza distinguishes a word and an idea, insofar the former is a mode of the attribute of 
Extension and the latter is a mode of the attribute of thought. But there is no direct 
parallelism between them, but the latter is certain inadequate idea that a human mind has 
from thinking the former. An example of the kind of illusions that language can generate, is 
the conception of the human will free from causes; i.e., the idea of the will capable of 
affirming or negating any idea without causal determination. For Spinoza’s philosophy, 
“free will” is an image that we can be picture through the association of the idea of the 
human will and the idea of the absence of causes; but that we can picture it does not mean 
that it is an adequate idea, because it is not.  
When we only regard to the different associations that people make to a word, we 
may conclude that: “[…] there are as many differences of brains as palates” (E1A, p. 82).  
As a matter of fact, imagination took advantage over intellect in order of 
constructing words.  
 
“[S]ince words are part of imagination, i.e., since we feign many 
concepts, in accordance with the random composition of words in the 
memory from some disposition in the body, it is not to be doubted that 
words, as much as the imagination, can be the cause of many and 
great errors, unless we are very wary of them.” [TdIE 88] 
 
Spinoza explains that: 
 
“[T]he imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves contain no 
error, or [...] the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but 
only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea that excludes the 
existence of those things which it imagines to be present to it” 
[2p17s]. 
 
Imagination is a natural process, which expresses the positivity of its cause. The mind does 
not doubt of the actual existence (presence) of the external object represented by its image, 
insofar as it is not affected by another idea that excludes the actual existence (presence) of 
that body. This happens when the human body (and the human mind by parallelism) has an 
affect that diminishes or restrains the power or vigor (vigeo)10 of the idea that affirms the 
	
10 Each image has a vigor (vigeant) that increases or decreases, because, “[...] images are not always equally 
vigorous” (Latin: “imagines non semper æquè vigeant”, 2p40s1, Gebhart II/121, l. 8). Albeit, Spinoza doesn’t 
say much about an image’s power or vigor, we can explain the increase of power by the frequency of similar 
affections, and the decrease of power by the absence of similar affections. But here arises two problems, if 
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actual existence or presence of the external body.11 Thus, the human mind does not err 
because it imagines. Error is a consequence of ignorance. Namely, when the mind has a 
private or isolated idea that excludes the actual existence (presence) of the external body 
(the thing represented by the image). In other words, the human mind does not have reason 
(2p49s: ratio) to exclude the existence of the external object. Through images, the human 
mind contemplates external bodies as actually existing as long as there is no idea that 
contradicts the existence of the external body (2p17; cf. supra);12 even though that external 
body is not present or it does not exist anymore (2p17c). In the human mind there is no 
affirmation or negation different from what the idea involves (2p49). The TdIE affirms that 
the human mind is an intellectual automaton (TdIE §85; cf. Ep 58, pp. 265- 266). 
 This absence of doubt is not a mathematical certainty, because it is not the product of 
an intellectual deduction. Following Descartes,13 in TTP, Spinoza calls this a “moral 
certainty,” a kind exclusive of the imagination.14 An image is a negative idea, insofar as it 
presents an object or set of objects but not as they are in themselves, but conditioned or 
determined from a certain point of view, i.e., from the particular affection received through 
its senses. 
 Error is the mental operation where a human mind affirms a false idea; which in case 
of language means that the body represented by a word actually exists as it has been 
accustomed to represent it. 
 
 
 
 
6. Connotation and action 
 
Memory does not stop with only one reference for each sign, but will associate many 
images to each sign, as many experiences as the person had with that sign. This association 
goes with a train of thoughts grounded in the particular habit of the person.  
	
this were the case: first, shouldn’t we have, right now, all the images that we have had since our childhood 
together with the ones we have now? Second, how do we explain age-old memories that we remember at 
present? I believe that Spinoza can respond by referring to the frequency of similar affections: we remember 
what is similar to what we are thinking, because the softness of the brain will not keep all of the traces it 
receives, but only the more frequent and similar affections. 
11 Moreover, even though each image is an idea that affirms the existence and the actual presence of an 
external body, it is given in a certain mind, and it is an idea that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains the 
power of that mind. 
12 It is important to consider that this proposition states that what is needed to change our contemplation is an 
affect (affectus), and not an affection (affectio). With this, it seems that Spinoza is confounding two distinct 
disciplines: the contemplation in epistemology (affectio), and the affects and feelings in psychology (affectus). 
Curley (Spinoza Collected Works: 464, n. 43) suggests that we should read “affection” instead of “affect.” He 
refers to the NS translation as “mode.” But the OP and the Vatican Manuscript (Spruit and Totaro, 2011: 138, 
l. 24) read the same word: “affectus.” Before 2p17, the word “affectus” only appears twice in the Ethics: in 
1p8s2 (II/49) when he considers the imagination of ascribing human affects to God, and in 2a3 where he 
considers an axiom that love, desire, and the like are affects of the mind that cannot be given without the idea 
of the thing loved, desired, etc. But it will not be until 3d3 where he defines affectus; cf. previous note. 
13 Cf. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Part IV, 205-206; AT VIIIA, 327-29. Descartes, 1985: 289-91. 
14 TTP 15:185-186, where Spinoza considers the good life of the prophets as moral certainty for their 
teachings. 
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Through other ideas related to the word’s reference, the human mind would 
continue another train of thoughts, which we can call the connotation of the word. Spinoza 
says that by the continuation of the process of memory, 
 
“[…] each of us will pass from one thought to another, as each one's 
association has ordered the images of things in the body. For example; 
a soldier, having seen traces of a horse in the sand, will immediately 
pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and 
from that to the thought of war, and so on. But a farmer will pass from 
the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, and then to that of a 
field, and so on. And so each one, according as he has been 
accustomed to join and connect the images of things in this or that 
way, will pass from one thought to another.” [2p18s] 
 
The different experiences and habits of a soldier and a farmer constitute a different train of 
thoughts that correspond to the way by which their respective bodies have associated 
affections. Being the traces of a horse the sign, the denotation of that sign will be a horse 
for both a soldier and a farmer. But having they different experiences with a horse, the 
connotation that they give to that sign will be different: the soldier has a train of thoughts 
that goes to a horseman, then to the thought of war, and so on; the farmer goes to a plow, 
then to the thought of a field, and so on. Meanwhile the traces of a horse in the sand induce 
a train of thoughts related with war, in the farmer they activate a train of thoughts related 
with plow. The traces of the horse do not involve the nature of war neither of plow, but the 
soldier and the farmer respective experiences make that relation. Thus the connotation of a 
word will depend on the particular experiences of each one.  
The different connotations of a same sign show the inadequacy of language, insofar 
there is no univocity in language, but each one will have in mind a connotation in order on 
his particular experiences. Scholars have been largely considered this, but they also have 
not considered another important issue for Spinoza’s philosophy: the terms “soldier” and 
“farmer” refer to specific occupations to which are related the experiences described by the 
train of thoughts of people who dedicate themselves to those activities. Even though the 
soldier and the farmer would discuss between them on the sense or connotation of the horse 
prints, a soldier will have the same train of thoughts of other soldiers, an will happen the 
same among farmers. Thus Spinoza is capable of explaining intersubjective knowledge in a 
certain community, as soldiers or farmers.  
Each context of denotation and connotation will impel their members to make the 
same mental associations with words. Thus,  
 
“Anyone who attempts to change the meaning of a word to which he 
is accustomed will have great difficulty in afterwards sticking 
consistently to the change in his speech and writing. We are thus 
wholly convinced, for these and other reasons, that it could never have 
entered into anyone’s head to corrupt a language but might certainly 
occur to someone to misrepresent the meaning of a writer by 
doctoring his texts or interpreting them wrongly.” [TTP 7, §9, p. 106] 
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This is extremely important for Spinoza’s lecture on the Holly Scripture. Spinoza 
proposes that a method for an adequate interpretation of Scripture should fullfill the 
following condition:  
 
“It is important to know of the life, character and concerns of each 
writer, so that we may know which statements are meant as laws and 
which as moral doctrine; we are more readily able to explain 
someone’s words, the better we know his mind and personality 
[genium et ingenium]. It is also crucial to know on what occasion, at 
what time and for what people or age the various texts were written so 
that we may not confuse eternal doctrines with those that are merely 
temporary or useful only to a few people.” [TTP 7, §5, p. 102] 
 
One of the keys of the interpretation of words and propositions expressed in the 
Scripture–as well as it will be for any language expression–is to know the mind and 
personality [genium et ingenium] of the wirter; i.e., the train of thoughts that he is 
accustomed by experience to associate words with things; i.e., the biography of the writer, 
his experiences, occupations, happiness, worries, concerns, character, etc. Through this 
knowledge we can make an adequate interpretation of the ends that the writer thought for 
his words or, what is the same, the sense of his words. Here we are not going to consider 
the difficulty for us of having a complete and adequate knowledge of all the writers of the 
Scripture. For the aim of my paper I am only considering the condition of knowing the 
biography of the writer. That knowledge will be an adequate and complete idea of the 
process in which his words have the denotations and connotations that they have. Thus that 
knowledge will let us know if his words were meant to be laws, moral doctrine, 
metaphysical truths or fables (TTP 7, §15, p. 110).  
Spinoza says: 
 
“Something intended to promote the practice of piety and religion is 
called sacred and divine and is sacred only so long as people use it 
religiously. If they cease to be pious, the thing in question likewise, at 
the same time, ceases to be sacred. If they devote that thing to impious 
purposes, the very object that before was sacred will be rendered 
unclean and profane.” [TTP 12, §5, p. 160]  
 
Spinoza uses the term “sacred” to refer to human actions accordant to moral precepts teach 
by the Scripture. As we have seen, language acquires denotation only in relation with 
certain images derived from experiences. It acquires connotation from other experiences 
and actions realized by the person using the language. Thus Spinoza continues, 
 
“Words acquire a particular meaning simply from their usage. Words 
deployed in accordance with this usage in such a way that, on reading 
them, people are moved to devotion will be sacred words, and any 
book written with words so used will also be sacred. But if that usage 
later dies out so that the words lose their earlier meaning, or if the 
book becomes wholly neglected, whether from wickedness or because 
people no longer need it, then both words and book will then likewise 
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have neither use nor sanctity. Lastly, if the same words are differently 
deployed or it becomes accepted usage to construe the [same] words 
in the contrary sense, then both words and book which were formerly 
sacred will become profane and impure. From this it follows that 
nothing is sacred, profane, or impure, absolutely and independently of 
the mind but only in relation to the mind.” [TTP 12, §5, p. 160] 
 
There is no sacred language or words by themselves, but only in relation with the actions 
that they induce. The usage of words is given by experience, and this is contained in the 
connotation of words for each person, society, activity, etc.  
According to Spinoza, the main objective of Scripture is not the explanation of 
metaphysical truths, but the obedience of moral precepts. And those precepts are expressed 
through the connotation of the words and expressions used in the text. Therefore, the dutch 
philosopher says that: 
 
“I assert only that the meaning, which alone entitles any text to be 
called divine, has come down to us uncorrupted, even though the 
words in which it was first expressed are deemed to have been 
frequently altered. As we said, this removes nothing from the dignity 
of Scripture; for Scripture would be no less divine even if written in 
other words or in a different language. Thus, no one can question that 
in this sense we have received the divine law, uncorrupted. For we see 
from Scripture itself, and without any difficulty or ambiguity, that the 
essence of the Law is to love God above all things and one’s neighbor 
as oneself. And this cannot be adulterated nor penned in a slap-dash, 
error-prone manner.” [TTP 10, §5, p. 165] 
 
Spinoza says that we have lost many references of the Hebrew words used in the Scripture, 
and thus we cannot translate them to other languages. Even though he is convinced that the 
Scripture is a moral book wrote by people who faced the danger of loosing their state. 
Moral precepts expressed in the Scripture can be translated to any language, only under the 
condition that in this they induce piety in the readers. Thus for moral ends, it does not 
matter that we cannot translate nor understand denotation of many words in the Scripture, 
so long we can understand its moral denotation. But this seems contradictory; insofar we 
have shown that connotation depends on denotation. Nevertheless Spinoza will answer that 
suffices finding that connotation in the stories that express certain denotations that we can 
understand. 
 Thus Spinoza says: 
 
“[…] Scripture does not offer definitions of the things which it speaks 
of, any more than does nature. Such definitions must be drawn from 
the various narratives about different things in Scripture just as 
definitions of natural things are deduced from the different actions of 
nature. The universal rule then for interpreting Scripture is to claim 
nothing as a biblical doctrine that we have not derived, by the closest 
possible scrutiny, from its own [i.e. the Bible’s] history.” [TTP 7, p. 
99] 
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Even though we cannot have the denotation or definition of many words in the Bible, we 
can get close to them by applying the same method that we use to know natural laws; i.e. by 
induction from the actions expressed in the Scripture. And he makes his claim to interpret 
Scripture by itself and not through the truth or falsity of its references.  
For the interpretation of Scripture the literal sense (signification or denotation) is the 
main sense. Spinoza says that: 
  
“By obscure expressions [in the Scripture] I mean those whose sense 
is difficult to elicit from the context of a passage while those whose 
meaning is readily elicited I call clear. I am not now speaking of how 
easily or otherwise their truth is grasped by reason; for we are 
concerned here only with their meaning, not with their truth. […] To 
make all this more clearly understood, I will give an example. Moses’ 
statements, ‘God is fire’ and ‘God is jealous’ are as plain as possible 
so long as we attend exclusively to the meaning of the words, and 
therefore I class them as clear expressions, even though, with respect 
to truth and reason, they are exceedingly obscure. Moreover even 
though their literal sense conflicts with the natural light of reason, 
unless it is also clearly in conflict with the principles and 
fundamentals derived from investigating the history of Scripture we 
must still stick to this, the literal sense.” [TTP 7, §§4-5, p. 100] 
 
We must distinguish between the meaning of an expression and its truth: the former brings 
the relation between the expression and certain images; whilst the latter refers to the 
relation between the expression and a real thing outside the human mind that grasps such 
relation. The passage continues:  
 
“In order to know whether or not Moses believed that God is fire, we 
certainly must not argue on the basis of whether this statement agrees 
or conflicts with reason but only from other statements made by 
Moses himself.” [TTP 7, §5, p. 100-1] 
 
“Now the word ‘fire’ also stands for anger and jealousy (see Job 
31.12), and therefore Moses’ statements are readily reconciled, and we 
are justified in concluding that they are one and the same. Again, 
Moses plainly teaches that God is jealous and nowhere teaches that 
God lacks emotions or mental passions. Hence, we must evidently 
deduce that this is what Moses believed, or at least what he wanted to 
teach, however much we may think this statement conflicts with 
reason.” [TTP 7, §5, p. 101] 
 
Spinoza appeals to other sacred books (in this case Job) to find the meaning of expressions 
such as “fire”.  
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7. Positivity in the image and its guidance under the intellect 
 
Is there something we can do with language? Do we have to put it aside and search for truth 
only in a reason and intuition that never deals with language? Does this aim have any 
sense? By way of what we have already said, we can be aware that words can deceive us. 
But at the same time, we know that any word is the idea of a causal physical process that 
expresses the power of extension; i.e., association laws of habit.  
After defining 20 affects¾such as desire, joy, and sadness¾at the end of book 
three of the Ethics, Spinoza says: 
 
“I know that in their common usage these words mean something else. 
But my purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of 
words. I intend to indicate these things by words whose usual meaning 
is not entirely opposed to the meaning with which I wish to use them. 
One warning of this should suffice.” [3A20]15 
 
This does not exclude the scientific or philosophical usage of language. It warns on 
the inadequacy (equivocity) of language. This passage shows: first, a straight relation 
between words and ideas, although in this case it is a relation between a word and an 
inadequate idea. Second, it shows a distinction between common usage of words and a 
philosophical usage, which interests more to Spinoza.  
It is important to note that with the association process Spinoza between a word and 
a sensory perception Spinoza can explain truth in nouns and propositions that have a 
physical reference identified through sensory perception. In this case, a word or a 
proposition will express a true idea if it corresponds to a physical object, being sensory 
perception the medium of validation. Nonetheless the word or preposition is a sign that is 
not true in itself, only if it is related to a true idea.  
Now is time to ask Spinoza about words and propositions that do not refer to 
physical things; mainly, what happens with metaphysical terms? Being Spinoza known as a 
metaphysical rationalist, he needs to have an explanation of the use of metaphysical terms.  
Spinoza says that, 
 
“Euclid, who wrote nothing that was not eminently straightforward 
and highly intelligible, is easily explained by anyone in any language. 
In order to see his meaning and be certain of his sense there is no need 
to have a complete knowledge of the language in which he wrote, but 
only a very modest, even schoolboy, acquaintance with it, nor does 
one need to know the life, interest and character of the author, nor in 
what language he wrote, to whom and when, nor the subsequent fate 
of his book or its variant readings, nor how or by what Council it was 
authorized”. [TTP 7, §17, p. 111] 
	
15 The following nomenclature is followed to reference the Ethics: first the number of the book; then “d” 
stands for Definition; “a” for Axiom; “p” for Proposition; “c” for Corollary; “post” of Postulate; “s” for 
Scholium; “d” for Demonstration; “A” for Appendix; “praef” for Preface; “lem” for Lemma. For other works: 
“TTP” for Theological-Political Treatise, followed by chapter and number of page in Gebhardt’s edition. 
“TdIE” for Emendation of the Intellect, followed by the number of the paragraph. “EP” for the 
Correspondence, followed by the number of the letter. 
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Language is part of nature,16 and there are no defects in nature, and its rules and laws 
(naturae leges, et regulae) are the same everywhere. Although language does not include 
its criterion of truth, we find that criterion outside it by using reason and common notions. 
Words and images can offer the material for the reason to obtain common notions, since 
“[w]hat is common to all things (on this see 2lem2 [of 2p13s], above) and is equally in the 
part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing” (2p37). 2lem2 
says that “[a]ll bodies agree in certain things”. And its demonstration states that “[...] all 
bodies agree in that they involve the concept of one and the same attribute (by 1d1), and in 
that they can move more slowly, now more quickly, and absolutely, that now they move, 
now they are at rest.” This example applies to the simplest bodies (2a2’’ above; these 
simple bodies are not atoms, see 1p15s). 
 But this statement is very important for Spinoza’s argument: “Nothing positive which 
a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true” (4p1). In this 
case, the knowledge of the true nature of a thing does not stop a random association that we 
can have through language. But the positivity of the word rests in the positivity of its 
object, i.e., in the positivity of the effect of a natural cause. At the same time, there is no 
absolute falsity (2p35d), because any inadequate idea, no matter how inadequate it is, is a 
fragment of (as if it were mutilated from) an adequate idea that is given in God’s Infinite 
Intellect. 
 Spinoza says: “So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true 
insofar as it is true, but because there occurs others, stronger [fortior] than them, which 
exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in 2p17.” (4p1s; 
bolds are ours).  
Spinoza is also capable of explaining natural languages and temperament by 
language: each language reinforce both denotation and connotation of words, i.e. certain 
things with certain articulated sounds, images and train of thoughts of things not related 
essentially with them. Therefore Spinoza can explain that language is so important for the 
life of certain people. 
 Through the rational definition of terms, by which the human mind can recall 
previous deductions, the human mind can reuse language for philosophical and scientific 
purposes. In this case, words will be joined to a rational denotation by which the human 
mind will follow not the contextual connotation, but the rational deduction.  
 This is an advancement of knowledge. What the human intellect can do with images 
is to recognize it as part of an adequate idea, a true idea that explains the image as one of its 
effects. The process will be as follows: First, we have to consider many images of related 
phenomena. Second, we consider what is common to all these images (similarities), and 
distinguish what is distinct between them. As we imagine singular things, we can perceive 
their common properties.17 Moreover, “Those things which are common to all, and which 
	
16  Images follow the Spinozian principle affirmed in 3Praef: “[...] nothing happens in Nature which can be 
attributed to any defect in it, for Nature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere 
one and the same, that is, the laws and rules of Nature, according to which all things happen, and change from 
one form to another, are always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the nature of 
anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, namely, through the universal laws of nature.” Thus, any 
change in nature follows the same rules and laws. Because of the parallelism of the attributes, the same rules 
and laws are used to understand those changes, including images and inadequate ideas. 
17 Gueroult, Spinoza. L’Âme, p. 334. 
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are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately” (2p38). Thus, 
any idea we deduce from this adequate idea will also be adequate (2p40), true (2p42 & 
2p43), necessary (2p44) and eternal by its cause (sub specie aeternitatis, 2p44c2).18 
 For instance, the mind will reject the contextual connotation of a word, but be able of 
understand it as part of a whole natural process. In other terms, the mind will be the 
adequate cause of some of its images.  
 An image is an inadequate idea. Spinoza considers that a word is a synthesis (or 
association) between certain sounds and certain images of things. These images are also 
synthesis of other images. Thus a word is a sign that refers to certain images.  
Scholars have pass out an important implicit supposition in Spinoza´s thoughts on 
language; that is, that a word and a proposition (or synthesis of words) only differs in that 
the former does not make explicit the images that it associates, whilst the latter does. 
Nevertheless this does not mean that any proposition expresses an adequate idea; to do so is 
needed the participation of reason and intuition.  
 As a matter of fact, the main problem of language is when it does not make explicit 
the images that is associates, and leave to the listener the freedom to interpret the 
connotation and denotation of the words as he has been accustomed to do it.  
Spinoza uses geometrical order because this makes explicit the ideas that it associates with 
words through definitions, axioms, postulates, and, over all, demonstrations.  
For the Dutch philosopher, the geometrical order is a kind of mental map that point out 
metaphysical entities and distinguishes them from mental entities (both entities from 
imagination and entities from reason), and indicates certain results that we must expect so 
long as we are doing the correct inferences and mental associations with them.  
If my reading is correct, there are a number of dangers, among which: how can be sure that 
we are making true inferences or demonstrations, and not just associations imposed through 
an authority argument. Examples of the Spinozian use of the authority argument are the 
pretended analogies between geometry and metaphysics, where Spinoza says that in the 
same manner in which the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles (2p49s, 
4p57s), the demonstration of a metaphysical entity X is also self-evident. What Spinoza 
must demonstrate is the reality and properties of that entity X through its constitutive 
elements, or something like that, but not through other things to which it is not 
metaphysically related, as happens with an analogy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
I have argued that language gives an inadequate knowledge of things insofar it is an 
idea of images and bodily motions associated arbitrarily; thus it represents fragments of a 
	
18 Klever (“Axioms in Spinoza’s Science and Philosophy of Science,” p. 182) comments that for Spinoza, 
“[t]he objective of science is: the concatenation of our perceptions (or, if one prefers this language, the 
phenomena). We try to bring them together and to integrate them in one model of the universe (or a section of 
it). There is, of course, no one-way-traffic: cross-sectional relationships are unavoidable. The way in which 
we can reach this endpoint is, the deduction of our perceptions (=phenomena) from general, all-pervasive 
characteristics or properties; or, in other words, the understanding of the diverse phenomena as appearances 
from fundamental axioms or laws.” Klever supports his view with TTP 5,§37 and TTP 7, §§6-7 and §12. 
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complete causal process. I also have stated that language falsity consists in the absence of 
correspondence between the word and a real thing. Meanwhile error is the mental operation 
where a human mind affirms that the thing represented by a word actually exists. In order 
to do these I have studied four examples of language in the Ethics: 1) the word “pomum” 
and its denotation (reference, significatio) is the association of two bodily motions (2p18s); 
2) the horse prints in the sand and its connotations (sensus) are the train of thoughts joined 
through habit (2p18s); 3) universal terms (“man”, “horse”, “good”) are certain degree of 
abstraction of particulars by habit (2p40s1); and 4) transcendental terms (“being”, “thing”) 
are a total abstraction of particulars (2p40s1). Lastly, I have proposed that¾for 
Spinoza¾language inadequacy can be overcome by a rational model that incorporates 
words redefined and related with common notions, intuitions, and the result of rational 
deduction; in which case language follows adequate ideas, and be signs of true knowledge. 
Geometrical method offers such rational model. But the application of this method to 
metaphysics is not straightforward, as Spinoza intended.  
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